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Abstract
Purpose:  This paper investigates the nature of conduct that existed in the U.S.  airline hub-to-hub
markets prior to the recent merger wave of the legacy carriers. We explore the strategic importance of
network  carrier  hubs  in  form  of  “spheres  of  influence”  on  airline  market  conduct.  We  also
simultaneously recognize the overgrowing role played by Low Cost Carriers (LCC) over the years by
estimating two conduct parameters - one in markets where LCCs directly compete head-to-head with
legacy carriers and the other for markets which LCCs do not serve but has presence in the hub airports
or adjacent airports comprising the market endpoints. Thus our supply side framework also sheds some
light on the issue of perfect contestability in airline industry.
Design/methodology: We  estimate  a  structural  oligopoly  model  for  differentiated  products  with
competitive interactions using DB1B data for first quarter of 2004.
Findings: Our results imply that the nature of competition is more aggressive relative to Bertrand
behavior in hub-to-hub markets and that these markets are less than perfectly contestable.
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Originality/value: This  paper  adds  to  the  empirical  literature  of  airline  competition  by  enabling
estimation of the actual conduct parameter assuming firm price setting behavior in presence of product
differentiation. Contrary to existing literature on airline competition, a structural model enables us to
systematically separate out effects of demand, cost and strategic factors on observed airline prices.
Keywords:  Structural  oligopoly;  product  differentiation;  hub-to-hub  markets;  conduct;  airline
competition; contestability; low cost carriers; spheres of influence.
1. Introduction
The U.S. airline industry has experienced substantial consolidation in the last decade following three
mergers  among the  large  network  carriers  namely  Delta  Airlines  and Northwest  Airlines  in  2008,
United Airlines and Continental Airlines in 2010 and finally American Airlines and U.S. Airways in
2013. Unlike the merger wave that followed deregulation in the 1980s, this recent consolidation of the
industry is often attributed to financial struggle faced by the network carriers driven by high fixed costs,
fluctuations  in  variable  costs  such as  fuel  and labor  and intense  price  competition  from low cost
carriers (hereafter, LCCs). Given the extent of overlapping routes among the major network carriers
this paper aims to evaluate the nature of conduct that existed in the industry prior to the merger wave
of the 2000’s. 
Specifically our study focusses on a subset of airline markets namely hub-to-hub markets i.e. markets
comprising of hubs of network carriers which are supposedly the vantage point of market power for
these airlines. Several studies such as Borenstein (1989), Evans and Kessides (1993), Lee and Luengo-
Prado (2005) have already documented how hubs can generate significant market power for the hub
airline  allowing it  to  charge  supracompetitive  prices  for  flights  to  and from hub airports.  Further
overlapping routes involving hub airports creates a strategic effect on an airline's pricing decision when
these airlines meet at each other’s hub airports. Gimeno (1999) observes that when airlines meet each
other  in  their  respective  hub  markets,  they  develop  mutually  recognized  “spheres  of  influence”
centered on their hub airports. Thus an airline refrains from initiating aggressive pricing actions in a
competitor's hub market fearing similar retaliation of the competitor in their own hub markets. The
idea is based on the fact that since an airline has more to lose in its hub airport in the event of a price
war, carriers will refrain from undercutting one another when they meet each other in their respective
hub markets. Evans and Kessides (1994) also voice their  concern regarding how hubs can become
important vantage points for airlines giving rise to development of spheres of influence centered in hub
-93-
Journal of Airline and Airport Management 6(1), 92-113
airports,  thus  enhancing  tacit  collusion.  In  fact,  Borenstein  (2004)  documents  the  Airline  Tariff
Publishing Case (ATPCO) of 1992 when eight legacy carriers were accused of price coordination by
announcing  future  fare  changes  using  fare  codes  and  footnote  designators  through  computer
reservation systems. The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) also pointed out that such information
sharing would have been most beneficial in routes where carriers had strong reciprocal relationships i.e.
multiple carriers' overlapping markets characterized by presence of each other’s hubs.
The objective of this paper is to analyze all tenets of competition in the U.S. airline industry within a
comprehensive modeling framework. This is achieved by estimating market conduct parameters using a
structural model of competitive behavior involving markets with endpoints which qualify as hubs of
network carriers. Only a handful of studies such as Brander and Zhang (1990), Oum, Zhang and Zhang
(1993), Fischer and Kamerschen (2003) have explicitly estimated the nature of conduct that exists in
airline markets in general and more specifically those involving hubs of legacy carriers. Our present
study adds to the empirical analysis of such market conduct in the U.S. airline industry in several ways.
First of all, these existing studies have assumed airline products as homogeneous and thus ignored the
presence of the widely accepted notion of product differentiation in the industry. Airline services have
long  been  viewed  as  differentiated  products  (Berry,  1990).  Demand  models  estimating  consumer
preferences for air travel products have accounted for product attributes such as stop v/s nonstop
flights, number of connections, airline's presence in endpoint airports etc. which significantly affect
consumers' choice of airlines and related itineraries. Building on the discrete choice empirical literature
in the airline industry, in the spirit of Berry, Carnall and Spiller (1996) (hereafter, BCS), Gayle (2006),
Aguirregabiria  and Ho (2012),  Berry  and Jia  (2010)  and Brown and Gayle  (2014),  we consider  an
oligopolistic framework in which airlines, offering differentiated products and facing asymmetric costs,
maximize profit by setting prices. Product differentiation is also an important determinant of market
power in that airlines develop a wide range of products to create their market niches. Market structure
is identified by the conduct parameters, which capture the interaction of price setting behaviors among
airlines. Instances of either fierce price wars (Busse, 2002) or price coordination (Borenstein, 2004)
common in the airline industry also justify a price setting oligopoly framework rather than quantity
setting behavior. Bilotkach (2005) also discusses why a price setting oligopoly might be appropriate for
the airline industry.  A structural  model of  differentiated oligopoly also enables us to systematically
separate out effects of demand, cost and strategic factors on observed airline prices. Further, in contrast
to duopoly markets out of a single hub considered in the previous literature, we consider hub-to-hub
markets where both market endpoints constitute a hub city of some network carrier. Our motivation in
favor of such market selection is reinforced by the fact that the strategic effect of a hub airport on an
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airline's pricing decision can be strengthened by realization of reciprocal territorial interests that are
created by the overlap of such hub markets,  an aspect not explored by previous studies on airline
conduct. Finally our study also allows us to explore the strategic importance of network carrier hubs on
airline market conduct simultaneously recognizing the overgrowing role played by LCCs in disciplining
markets through intense competition. LCC competition in the U.S. airline industry has been extensively
documented by Dresner and Windle (1999), Ito and Lee (2003), U.S. Department of Transportation
(1993, 2001), Brueckner, Lee and Singer (2013) and others. Our model set up will allow us to jointly
estimate two conduct parameters in hub-to-hub markets - one in markets where LCCs directly compete
head-to-head  with  legacy  carriers  and  the  other  for  markets  which  LCCs  do  not  serve  but  have
presence in the hub airports or adjacent airports comprising the market endpoints. Thus this paper also
sheds some light on the role of actual vs. potential competitive effect of LCCs on market conduct, a
topic which has been the cornerstone of previous studies on airline market contestability like Dresner,
Lin and Windle (1996), Morrison (2001) and Goolsbee and Syverson (2008).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we outline the structural model
of  airline  demand,  supply  and finally  incorporate  competitive  interactions  to  enable  estimation  of
conduct parameters. In Section 3 we overview the data and depict the estimation procedure with a
focus on identification issues. Results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. The Model
We first discuss the structural specification of the demand model for airline products. Then we lay out
the supply  side and subsequently  specify the marginal  cost  of  production.  Finally  we augment  the
supply side in order to incorporate competitive interactions among airlines in equilibrium.
2.1. Demand Specification
A market is defined as a directional city-pair consisting of an origin city and a destination city. This
allows  the  characteristics  of  origin  and  destination  cities  to  affect  demand.  Further  the  market
definition based on city pairs instead of  airport  pairs  turns out to be an important aspect  for this
current study. This is because sometimes some LCCs typically avoid the congested hub airports and
choose smaller secondary airports to serve markets based on these important hub cities e.g. instead of
Dallas/Fort  Worth  International  Airport  (DFW)  which  is  a  hub  airport  for  American  Airlines,
Southwest chooses the much smaller airport Dallas Love Field (DAL) to fly markets comprising of
Dallas/Ft. Worth as an endpoint city. On the demand side this allows for substitution of airports and
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airlines by passengers while on the supply side this enables an airline to potentially compete with a
major hub airline without even physically serving the hub airport itself. Within each market a product is
defined as a round-trip between the origin and the destination cities involving a unique combination of
a ticketing carrier and flight itinerary. An itinerary consists of an origin, destination and intermediate
airports that the passenger travels through. An example of three products in the Chicago-Washington
D.C. market are:
• a non-stop ticket with itinerary ORD-DCA:DCA-ORD marketed by American Airlines,
• a two-stop itinerary MDW-CVG-DCA:DCA-CVG-MDW marketed by Delta Airlines and
• a non-stop itinerary ORD-IAD:IAD-ORD marketed by United Airlines. 
It should be noted, however, that we do not further differentiate products of identical itinerary-airline
combination but having different prices to avoid estimation problems that will arise with extremely
small product market shares.
In the spirit of BCS (1996), Berry and Jia (2010) and Brown and Gayle (2014), we model air travel
demand using a discrete choice framework. In particular, we assume that a potential passenger  n in
market t chooses between J(t+1) alternatives where j=0 is the outside good representing the passenger's
option of not buying any of the  Jt products. The outside option also represents alternative modes of
transportation that the consumer might choose to travel between the origin and destination. Then the
products in each market can be broadly partitioned into two mutually exclusive and exhaustive groups,
g Î  {0,1},  where  the outside option is  the only member of  group 0.  Following this  specification,
consumer n's indirect utility from product j in market t can be represented as
unjt = δjt+ςngt + (1-σ) εnjt (1)
where  δjt is the mean valuation of product j across passengers in market  t. The term ςngt  captures the
random component of utility that is common to all products in group g while  εnjt is a consumer and
product  specific  idiosyncratic  error  term,  the  sum  of  which  thus  represents  the  deviation  of  an
individual passenger's utility around the mean product valuation. The parameter σ lies between 0 and 1
and captures the correlation in consumers' utility among products belonging to the same group. Higher
values of σ imply that the consumer views products in different nests, here flying or not flying, as poor
substitutes.  The  mean utility  δjt from product  j is  expressed  as  a  function  of  price  and non-price
characteristics of the product as follows
δjt = xjtβ - αpjt + ξj + Δξjt (2)
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where xjt is a vector of observed product characteristics (number of stops in the itinerary, the airline's
scale  of  operation in the  origin and destination airports),  β is  a  vector  of  marginal  utilities  of  the
different characteristics included in xjt, pjt is the ticket price and α measures marginal disutility of price. ξj
are airline fixed effects controlling for carrier specific product characteristics which are common across
markets while Δξjt accounts for any remaining product characteristics which are unobserved by the
researcher and takes on a value that sets observed market shares equal to those predicted by the model.
This differentiated product assumption is vital since the goal of the model is to analyze competition
between carriers in hub-to-hub markets. Berry (1990) and BCS (1996) show that passengers value the
size of a hub carrier's network and this superior product quality explains much of the hub premium, the
premium a carrier is able to charge on itineraries originating or terminating at its hub airport.
Assuming both εnjt  and ςngt  + (1-σ) εnjt are type I extreme value random variables, the respective product
market  shares  can  be  transformed  following  Berry (1994)  to  yield  the  following  linear  estimation
equation
ln (sjt) - ln (s0t) = xjtβ - αpjt + σ ln (sj ⁄gt) + ξj + Δξjt (3)
where sjt represents product j's market share, s0t, the share of the outside good, and sj ⁄gt the group share
of product j. The demand for product j in market t is given by
qjt (xt, pt, Δξjt; θd)=Mtsjt (xt, pt, Δξjt; θd) (4)
where  xt and  pt are respectively the vectors of observed non-price product characteristics and price,
Δξjt is a vector of unobserved product characteristics, Mt the market size and θd = (β,α,σ) is the vector of
demand parameters to be estimated.
2.2. Supply and Marginal Cost Specification
There are F multiproduct firms in T markets. In each market t a firm f sells a subset Jft of the total set of
Jt products sold in market t. Assuming price-setting behavior, the variable profit of firm f in a market is
given by
π f =∑ iÎ J f ∩V g ( pi−c i )Ms i (x , p , ξ ;θd) (5)
where ci is the marginal cost of product i, which is assumed to be constant with respect to the quantity
sold and Vg is the set of products in nest g. It is to be noted that we drop the market subscript t in order
to avoid notational clutter; hence all subsequent equations are to be treated as if they are indexed by t.
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We do not have data for marginal cost, so they need to be estimated in order to make identification of
the conduct parameters possible. We specify marginal cost of product j using the functional form below
following the linear marginal cost specification outlined by Aguirregabiria and Ho (2012) and Berry and
Jia (2010).
cj =Wj γ + ηj + ωj (6)
where  Wj is a vector of observed variables that shift cost (number of stops in the itinerary, itinerary
distance and hub status of origin and destination airports), ηj are product fixed effects (airline dummies)
capturing market invariant components of airline's products' marginal cost,  ωj is a random error term
capturing  unobserved  (to  the  researcher)  idiosyncratic  factors  affecting  costs  and  γ is  a  vector  of
unknown cost parameters to be estimated.  
2.3.Competitive Interactions
In the spirit of Sudhir (2001) and Verboven (1996), the degree of competition or market conduct is
measured by the extent to which equilibrium prices deviate from Bertrand-Nash prices. We implement
this by augmenting the profit function in equation 5 as follows
π f =∑ iÎ J f∩V g ( pi−c i )Ms i+φ k∑ i∉ J f ∩V g ( p i−c i )Ms i (7)
where  φk is  the weight that an airline puts on its  competitors'  profits.  A similar  exposition is  also
presented in Bresnahan (1987). This specification has the convenient property of nesting both Bertrand
and collusive outcomes as special cases when φk takes values of zero and one respectively. At the same
time, φk > 0 will imply more cooperative behavior relative to Bertrand as the firm puts positive weights
on its competitors' profits whereas  φk < 0 will imply more aggressive behavior relative to Bertrand.
Since we are interested in exploring conduct in the presence and absence of LCCs in the market, we
allow the conduct parameter to capture different weights in these different scenarios by indexing it with
k. Thus k refers to two market groups namely markets with LCCs and markets without LCCs.
Assuming a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists at strictly positive prices, we can express the first-
order profit maximizing conditions as
π f
 p j
=s j+∑ iÎ J f∩V g ( pi−c i )
 s i
 p j
+φ k∑ i∉ J f∩V g ( pi−c i )
 s i
 p j
=0, ∀ j Î J f∩V g (8)
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If there are a total of J products taken all markets together, then we have J first order conditions which
can be summarized in vector form as follows
p=c+[(p)✳ (Θ
own+∑k Ψkcomp)]−1s(p)⏟
Markup
(9)
where Δ(p) is a JXJ matrix of first-order derivatives of product market shares with respect to prices, *
implies Hadamard product of two matrices, Θown and Ψk
comp are JXJ ownership matrices defined as 
Θown(i , j )={ 1 if i a nd j belong t o the same airline0 otherwise
and
Ψk
comp( i , j )={ φ k if i an d j are distinct products offered by differentairlines a nd belong t o the same market group k0 otherwise
We follow Goldberg (1995) and Verboven(1996) in assuming that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
exists and proceed below to derive the pricing equation.
For the nested logit model, the supply side pricing equation has a closed form which can be brought
into data for estimation. The pricing equation for product j belonging to firm f in a market is given by
p j=c j+
1
 [ 1
1−σ −L g (∑ i Î J f∩V g q i+φ k(1−(1−φ k)(1−σ )L g∑ i Î J f ∩V g q i )Y g )]
(10)
where L g=
1
M +
σ
(1−σ ) Q g
and Y g=∑c ÎF
c≠ f
Qc
1−(1−φ k)(1−σ )L g Q c
such that Qg and Qc are the sums of
quantities of all products in nest g and products belonging to firm c in nest g respectively. Substituting
equation 6 inequation 10 yields the following estimable equation
ω j= p j−
1
 [ 1
1−σ −L g (∑ i Î J f ∩V g q i+φ k(1−(1−φ k)(1−σ )L g∑ i Î J f∩V g q i)Y g )]
−W j γ−η j (11)
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Specifically,  θs =  (γ,  ΦLCCMkt,  ΦNon-LCCMkt) is the vector of parameters we estimate on the supply side
where  ΦLCCMkt and  ΦNon-LCCMkt are  the  conduct  parameters  for  markets  with  and  without  LCCs
respectively.
3. Data and Estimation Procedure
3.1. Data
Data employed in this  analysis  is  drawn from the DB1B market  survey which is  a  quarterly  10%
random sample of all itineraries published by the U.S. Department of Transportation. Three separate
databases of DB1B namely DB1B-Coupon, DB1B-Market and DB1B-Ticket were used for this paper.
DB1B-Coupon provides information at the coupon or boarding pass level, DB1B-Market reports one
directional  origin-destination  itinerary  specific  data  while  DB1B-Ticket  consists  of  summary
information for the entire trip of the passenger. Altogether these datasets provide information, among
other  things,  on  operating  and  ticketing  carriers,  origin  and  destination  airports,  sequence  of
intermediate  airports,  number  of  passengers  transported,  distance  flown  and  fare  paid.  Data  was
collected for the first quarter of 2004 and the three databases were merged using the unique Itinerary
ID common in all these datasets.  
Since our paper is about competition in hub-to-hub markets, we confine the dataset to observations
where origin and destination cities qualify as U.S. hub cities for the major network carriers. In case of
stop flights,  we consider  only  those  itineraries  which  involve  intermediate  airports  in  the  48  U.S.
contiguous states. We drop observations where either the operating or the ticketing carrier is a foreign
airline. Following Berry and Jia (2010) and Gayle (2006), firm assignments are done according to the
ticketing carrier. We use the fare screen in the DB1B data set to eliminate tickets with possible coding
errors. We also drop itineraries with extremely high or low fares and those which cannot be correctly
identified as round trips. We keep tickets with a maximum of five coupons. Finally we only consider
tickets where the ticketing carrier is the same for the different segments of the itinerary. Our final set of
ticketing carriers is presented in Table 1 where we group them according to their type i.e. legacy carrier
or LCC.
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Legacy Carriers
Carrier Name Carrier Code
American AA
Alaska AS
Continental CO
Delta DL
Northwest NW
United UA
US Airways US
Midwest YX
LCCs
Carrier Name Carrier Code
JetBlue B6
Frontier F9
Airtran FL
America West HP
Spirit NK
Sun Country SY
ATA TZ
Southwest WN
Table 1. List of Legacy and Low Cost Carriers
Table 2 provides a list of hubs of the legacy carriers. In the same table we also report the hub cities in
which these hub airports are located and whose combinations make up the markets in our sample. In
this paper we consider markets comprised of hubs of only airlines classified as major carriers by the
U.S. Department of Transportation i.e. those with annual operating revenues of more than $1 billion.
Since Midwest Airlines does not fall under this category we do not explicitly consider hubs of Midwest,
although we keep the carrier in our analysis. On the other hand, Alaska Airlines concentrates most of
its business in Seattle, Portland, Los Angeles and Anchorage with 68% of its total in and outbound
traffic being generated in Seattle (2004 Annual Report). Thus, in spite of being a major carrier, Alaska
gets  underrepresented in our sample which prevents us from using hubs of  Alaska as part  of our
market consideration. For our paper we restrict ourselves to markets formed by hubs of the six largest
major carriers following Lee and Luengo-Prado (2005).
-101-
Journal of Airline and Airport Management 6(1), 92-113
Airline Hub City (State) Hub Airport (Code)
AA
Dallas/Ft. Worth (TX) Dallas/Ft. Worth Int'l (DFW)
Chicago (IL) O'Hare Int'l (ORD)
Miami (FL) Miami Int'l (MIA)
St. Louis (MO) Lambert-Louis Int'l (STL)
CO
New York/Newark (N.Y./N.J.) Newark Liberty Int'l (EWR)
Houston (TX) GeorgeBush Intercontinental (IAH)
Cleveland (OH) Cleveland-Hopkins Int'l (CLE)
DL
Atlanta (GA) Hartsfield Jackson Int'l (ATL)
Cincinnati (OH) Cincinnati-N. Kentucky Int'l (CVG)
Salt Lake City (UT) Salt Lake City Int'l (SLC)
NW
Detroit (MI) Detroit Metro (DTW)
Minneapolis/St. Paul (MN) Minneapolis/St.Paul Int'l (MSP)
Memphis (TN) Memphis Int'l (MEM)
UA
Chicago (IL) O'Hare Int'l (ORD)
Denver (CO) Denver Int'l (DEN)
San Francisco (CA) San Francisco Int'l (SFO)
Washington D.C. (DC) Dulles Int'l (IAD)
Los Angeles (CA) Los Angeles Int'l (LAX)
US
Philadelphia (PA) Philadelphia Int'l (PHL)
Charlotte (NC) Charlotte Douglas Int'l (CLT)
Pittsburgh (PA) Pittsburgh Int'l (PIT)
Source: Form 10-K and Annual Reports of the different airlines for 2004
Table 2. Hubs of Legacy Carriers (2004)
After our initial filtering of the data, we still find similar airline-itinerary observations with different
fares. This reflects the commonly practiced yield management techniques by the airlines. Since we do
not have information on such ticket specific restrictions and further to make estimation manageable,
we collapse the data by aggregating passengers to the level of unique airline and itinerary combination.
Thus our product is a unique combination of the origin airport, the intermediate connecting airports,
the destination airport,  the ticketing carrier  and the passenger weighted average ticket  Price for the
airline-itinerary combination. Our final sample has 15,828 products offered across 372 directional hub-
to-hub markets.
The variables which we construct to be included on the demand side in the vector of observed product
characteristics are - Stops which is the total number of stops in the itinerary, and AirlinePresenceOrigin and
AirlinePresenceDest based on the number of cities that a ticketing carriers connects to from the origin and
destination airports respectively by non-stop flights. Population figures from the U.S. Census Bureau is
used to calculate the  potential  market  size  M which we assume to be the  geometric  mean of the
population of the origin and destination cities that comprise the market. To control for the fact that
appeal of the outside option can be different for different markets originating from the same city, we
use controls for vacation oriented markets.  Vacation is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 for
tourist oriented destinations. Variables which we include in the marginal cost specification other than
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Stops are -  ItinDistance i.e. roundtrip distance traveled by the passenger and a  Hub dummy capturing
whether the origin or destination airport is a hub for the airline.
Summary statistics of our sample is presented in Table 3. We notice substantial heterogeneity in the
airlines' scale of operation in origin and destination airports as well as in the hub variable thus showing
the dominant positions held by some carriers in their hub airports. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Price ($100) 4.81 3.37 0.50 45.18
Stops 1.72 0.73 0 3
AirlinePresenceOrigin (100 cities) 0.44 0.41 0 1.44
AirlinePresenceDest (100 cities) 0.46 0.42 0 1.44
Vacation 0.27 0.44 0 1
ItinDistance ('000 miles) 3.21 1.38 0.19 7.82
Hub 0.59 0.49 0 1
Product market share (%) 0.34e-2 0.02 0.18e-4 0.53
Firm market share (%) 16.38 24.42 0.02 99.60
Market size (100K) 10.34 8.36 2.38 56.97
No. of Observations: 15,828
Source: Author’s calculations.
Table 3. Summary Statistics
The  firm  market  share  also  reveals  some  important  information  about  the  nature  of  hub-to-hub
markets. The high standard deviation of this variable reveals the fact that some hub carriers manage to
disproportionately attract more passengers departing from or arriving at their hub airports. In order to
gain some insight regarding the exposure of hub network carriers to LCCs in their hub airports (or
adjacent airports in case of multi-airport cities), we take a look at Table 4.
It is  evident from the table that LCCs have established their presence in all  hub cities of network
carriers with the exception of Cincinnati. This has been achieved through either directly offering service
from the hub airport or in some cases adjacent airports in the same city. Table 5 further illustrates the
extent of LCC penetrationin hub-to-hub markets that originate from or terminate into different hub
cities  of  network  carriers.  Both  Tables  4  and  5  clearly  reveal  the  nature  of  actual  and  potential
competition that network carriers face in their hub airports. 
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Hub City Hub Airport LCC in Hub Airport Other Airport inCity
LCC in Other
Airport
Atlanta ATL F9, FL, HP None None
Charlotte CLT TZ None None
Chicago ORD HP, NK MDW F9, FL, TZ, WN
Cincinnati CVG None None None
Cleveland CLE HP, WN None None
Dallas/Ft. Worth DFW F9, FL, HP, SY, TZ DAL WN
Denver DEN B6, F9, FL, HP, NK, SY, TZ None None
Detroit DTW HP, NK, WN None None
Houston IAH F9, HP, WN HOU FL, WN
Los Angeles LAX F9, FL, HP, NK, SY, TZ, WN None None
Memphis MEM FL, HP None None
Miami MIA FL, HP, SY, TZ None None
Minneapolis/St. Paul MSP F9, FL, HP, SY, TZ None None
New York/Newark EWR FL, HP, TZ JFK B6, HP, SYLGA F9, FL, NK, TZ
Philadelphia PHL FL, HP, TZ None None
Pittsburg PIT FL, HP, TZ None None
Salt Lake City SLC B6, F9, HP, WN None None
San Francisco SFO F9, FL, HP, TZ None None
St. Louis STL F9, HP, WN None None
Washington D.C. IAD FL, HP DCA F9, FL, HP, TZ
Table 4. LCC Presence in Hub Cities of Network Carriers (2004)
Hub City % of O&D H-H marketsserved by LCCs
Number of LCCs in
Hub City
Atlanta 73.68 3
Charlotte 31.58 1
Chicago 94.74 6
Cincinnati 0 0
Cleveland 36.84 2
Dallas/Ft. Worth 78.95 6
Denver 94.74 7
Detroit 42.11 3
Houston 89.47 4
Los Angeles 94.74 7
Memphis 68.42 2
Miami 73.68 4
Minneapolis/St. Paul 78.95 5
New York/Newark 63.16 7
Philadelphia 57.89 3
Pittsburg 55.26 3
Salt Lake City 84.21 4
San Francisco 92.11 4
St. Louis 47.37 3
Washington D.C. 57.89 4
Note: O&D H-H markets represent all hub-to-hub markets formed with the hub
cityas either origin or destination of a roundtrip travel.
Source: Author's calculation from DB1B sample.
Table 5. Hub-to-Hub Market Coverage of LCCs from each Hub City (2004)
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3.2. Identification
On  the  demand  side,  equilibrium  prices  and  market  shares  will  depend  on  both  observed  and
unobserved product characteristics. Thus although unobserved to the researcher, the contemporaneous
demand shock Δξj will be observed by market participants. As a result price and within group market
shares will be correlated with the error term and thus OLS estimates of both α and σ will be biased. To
overcome this problem we use an instrumental variable technique to estimate the parameters of the
model.  The  best  candidates  for  instruments  in  the  differentiated  products  case  are  the  product
characteristics themselves, which are usually treated to be exogenous, based on the assumption that in
the short run they cannot be quickly adjusted by a firm. Our choice of the second set of instruments is
based  on  the  proposition  by  Berry,  Levinsohn  and  Pakes  (1995)  (hereafter,  BLP).  They  suggest
functions of the exogenous characteristics of competitors can qualify as instruments since they affect
the  competitive  environment  in  the  market  and  thus  pricing  decision  of  the  firm  while  being
uncorrelated with the carrier's demand shock. In this spirit we include the means and sums of rival
carriers' origin and destination airport presences as well as number of competitors and total number of
competitor  products  in  the  market  with  equivalent  number  of  intermediate  stops  as  instruments.
Another identification strategy relies on variables that shift marginal cost but does not affect demand.
Based on this argument itinerary distance qualifies as a valid candidate for the instrumental vector.
Motivated by supply theory of multiproduct pricing, we also include total number of products with
equivalent  number  of  stops  offered  by  the  firm  in  the  market  as  valid  instruments.  To  enhance
identification  we  also  use  dummies  for  vacation-oriented  destinations.  Finally  in  addition  to  the
exogenous  product  characteristics,  all  the  exogenous  variables  appearing  in  the  share  equation  are
included in the instrument vector Zd since they are correlated with themselves but uncorrelated with the
error term Δξj.
On the supply side in the pricing equation, the structural error term ωj which captures the unobserved
components of marginal cost is expected to be correlated with price. Moreover the markup term in the
pricing equation is a function of shares which themselves are functions of prices. Hence the markup
term is also likely to be endogenous. Our supply side instrument vector  Zs includes all the excluded
instruments that we use on the demand side other than itinerary distance based on a similar logic.
Additionally all exogenous variables in the pricing equation also form a part of Zs.  
Based  on equation  11,  it  can  be  seen that  assessment  of  market  power  and hence  choice  of  the
appropriate oligopoly pricing model fundamentally rests on the substitution patterns generated by the
demand model under consideration. Our choice of a nested logit demand specification is supported by
the fact that it generates flexible substitution patterns necessary for reliable estimation of the supply
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side. On the other hand, absence of publicly available marginal cost data imposes a further challenge in
distinguishing between alternative models of oligopoly competition (Bresnahan, 1982). Specifically, an
identification problem arises in discerning whether higher marginal costs or higher values of conduct
parameter rationalize higher observed prices. Based on the intuition of Bresnahan (1982) and recent
work by  Berry and  Haile  (2014),  changes in the “market environment” can be used to distinguish
between competing models of oligopoly conduct based on changes in firms' incentive to collude. We
believe that our current distinction of hub-to-hub markets with and without LCCs provides such an
opportunity to enable identification of conduct parameters on the supply side.
3.3. Estimation
Our estimation of both demand and supply side parameters rests on the critical assumption that the
structural error terms are orthogonal to the vector of instruments i.e. E[Δξj|Zd] = 0 and E[Δωj|Zs] = 0.
There is some efficiency gain if demand and supply are estimated jointly (BLP 1995). But on the other
hand a step-by-step estimation reduces the computational burden of the estimation. At the same time
the demand side identification in such a procedure becomes independent of the specification of the
supply  side  functional  form.  Lastly  it  also  reduces  the  need  for  a  vast  set  of  instruments  that  is
demanded in the joint estimation of the parameters of the system. This is because identification of the
model parameters requires the rank of the instrumental variables matrix to be at least as large as the
number of parameters to be estimated. Following Nevo (2001) and Goldberg and Verboven (2001), we
first estimate the demand system and use the estimated demand parameters to construct the matrix
Δ(p) of own and cross price derivatives. Then we substitute this matrix into the pricing equation to
estimate the supply side parameters subsequently.
Since the share equation is linear in parameters, the demand side is estimated using a two stage least
squares (2SLS) procedure. On the other hand the supply parameters enter the pricing equation in a
highly nonlinear fashion. As a result we use a nonlinear Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)
procedure to estimate the pricing equation. We exploit the orthogonality condition of the error term ωj
to form moment conditions whereby the GMM routine estimates the vector of parameters which sets
the sample analogue of the covariance of the errors and the instruments as close as possible to zero. In
particular, the GMM estimate is given by
θ^ s=argminθ sω (θ s)' Z s Ω
−1Z s
' ω (θ s) (12)
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where Zs is a N X L matrix of supply side instruments such that N is the sample size, L is the number
of instruments and Ω-1 is a positive definite optimal weight matrix.
4. Results
4.1. Demand Estimates
Results from the demand estimation are shown in Table 6. The noticeable difference in the magnitude
of  OLS  and  2SLS  estimates  of  Price and  ln (sj⁄gt)  illustrates  the  endogeneity  of  these  variables.  All
coefficient estimates are statistically different from zero at 1% level of significance. As expected, Price
has a negative impact on consumers' mean valuation of airline products. Estimate of σ lies between 0
and 1, implying that our model is consistent with the principles of random utility maximization. This
indicates that  air  travel  products  within a  market are viewed as better  substitutes than the outside
option. The negative coefficient on Stops depicts the inherent inconvenience associated with itineraries
with  connecting  flights.  Both  AirlinePresenceOrigin and  AirlinePresenceDest affect  consumers'  utility
positively  thus  indicating  consumers'  preference  of  flying  with  an  airline  having  larger  scales  of
operation at origin and destination airports. Such preference is likely to be based on convenient flight
schedules,  airport  facilities  and  loyalty  programs  associated  with  the  airline.  Finally,  the  positive
Vacation coefficient shows that tourist oriented cities attract more consumers.
Our nested logit model yields a median elasticity of 1.91 which is slightly higher than found by earlier
studies estimating random utility models of airline products like Berry and Jia (2010). Such a difference
is  likely  to arise  because Berry and Jia  (2010)  estimates  a  more flexible  random coefficient  model
allowing for two types of passengers with different price sensitivities. On the other hand our current
analysis is based on only a subset of markets namely hub-to-hub markets instead of a larger set of
markets as considered in the other studies. However our elasticity value lies within the reasonable range
of 0.181 to 2.01 as reported by a survey of air travel demand elasticities conducted by Gillen, Morrison
and Stewart (2008).
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Variable OLS 2SLSEst. S.E. Est. S.E.
Price -0.035 0.002 -0.200 0.012
ln (sj⁄gt) 0.774 0.003 0.614 0.007
Stops -0.245 0.009 -0.354 0.015
AirlinePresenceOrigin 0.264 0.014 0.568 0.033
AirlinePresenceDest 0.098 0.014 0.168 0.023
Vacation 0.350 0.013 0.259 0.018
Constant -7.650 0.117 -7.992 0.157
R-squared: 0.847  0.736  
Observations:15,828
Note: All estimations include airline dummy variables although the coefficient estimates of the dummy variables 
are not reported for brevity. All estimates are significant at 1% level.
Table 6. Demand Parameter Estimates 
4.2. Estimates of Marginal Cost and Conduct Parameters
We report our GMM estimates from the pricing equation in Table 7. All coefficients of our marginal
cost  specification  have  the  expected  signs  and  are  significant  at  conventional  levels  of  statistical
significance. In fact the signs of our marginal cost parameters are in accord with earlier studies such as
Berry and Jia (2010).
Variable Est. S.E.
Marginal Cost Shifters
Stops 0.367 0.041
ItinDistance 0.298 0.031
Hub -0.370† 0.176
Constant 1.026 0.267
Conduct Parameters
ΦNon-LCCMkt -0.736 0.188
ΦLCCMkt -1.308 0.150
Observations: 15,828
Note: Estimation includes airline dummy variables. All estimates are 
significant at 1% level except † which indicates statistical significance at 5%
level.
Table 7. GMM Estimates from Pricing Equation
The positive coefficient on Stops implies that connecting flies are more expensive to operate than non-
stop flights.  Berry and Jia  (2010) argues that  there are two countervailing factors which affect  the
marginal  cost  of  connecting  flights.  On one  hand  load  consolidation  by  pooling  passengers  with
different destinations through the connecting airport can lead to economies of density thus resulting in
lower marginal costs. But on the other hand more connections imply more takeoffs and landings which
can lead to higher costs due to increased fuel consumption. Our results indicate that the net effect of
these two factors is positive which might be a consequence of higher fuel prices during the sample
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period  offsetting  any  efficiency  gain  from economies  of  traffic  density  resulting  from connecting
flights. The coefficient on the  Hub dummy is negative indicating marginal cost is lower for airlines
flying into and out of their hub airports. Thus in spite of presence of congestion and delays in hub
airports,  airlines seem to exploit  economies of  scale in these airports  by flying larger fuel  efficient
aircrafts. Finally, as expected, longer routes have higher marginal costs.
Next we look at the estimated conduct parameters from the pricing equation which is the focus of our
current paper.  Both the competitive interaction parameters ΦNon-LCCMkt and  ΦLCCMkt are negative and
statistically significant. This implies that competition is more aggressive than the Bertrand benchmark
in hub-to-hub markets with and without LCC presence, with the degree of aggressiveness heightened in
markets served by LCCs. Our results corroborate the critical role played by LCCs in disciplining airline
markets, both in form of actual and potential competition. We further check whether the nature of
such aggressive competition is uniform across all  hub-to-hub markets i.e.  formally we test whether
ΦNon-LCCMkt is statistically equal to ΦLCCMkt.We test the null hypothesis H0: ΦNon-LCCMkt = ΦLCCMkt against the
alternative hypothesis H1:  ΦNon-LCCMkt >  ΦLCCMkt. The z score calculated is found to be 2.527 which is
higher than the critical z value at 1% level of significance, thus leading to the rejection of H 0 in favor of
H1. Our test results indicate that the two conduct parameters are not statistically equivalent  to each
other thus implying that extent of aggressive competition is softened in the absence of LCCs. This
further lends support to the idea that potential competition by LCCs is not a perfect substitute for
actual competition.
5. Conclusion
This  paper  explicitly  estimates  conduct  parameters  in  hub-to-hub  airline  markets  i.e.  markets
characterized by presence of network carrier hub airports at both market endpoints prior to the onset
of the merger wave of the network carriers in the 2000s. In order to highlight the growing importance
of LCCs in shaping market  conduct,  we further distinguish between conduct  in  markets  with and
without LCC service. In doing so this paper acknowledges the prevalence of product differentiation
and price setting behavior in the airline industry by utilizing a structural econometric framework for
differentiated products with competitive interactions. The empirical results indicate that the nature of
competition is more aggressive relative to Bertrand behavior in hub-to-hub markets. The competitive
intensity is also found to be higher in markets actually served by LCCs compared to those where LCCs
are potential entrants thus implying that airline markets are less than perfectly contestable. Given the
sample period of this study, our results shed light on the strategic importance of hubs during an era of
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changing landscape of airline competition and raises questions regarding the impact of such intense
competition on the economic sustainability and organizational structure of the industry in the future. 
Deregulation of the airline industry has resulted in substantial  consumer benefits but the extensive
growth of legacy carrier hubs had raised the concern that industry competition is less than perfect. But
since 2000 industry conditions have changed dramatically which have led to acute financial distress for
the legacy carriers. Intense competition coupled with high fixed costs and increasing burden of labor
and fuel  expenses in the face of  declining  industry demand attributed to the  declining margins of
network carriers. In fact legacy carriers also started to lose their strong foothold in their respective hub
airports. Borenstein (2005) reports a 12% decline in hub premium in the 10 most expensive airports in
the nation between 1995 and 2004. In fact many of these hubs which were long believed to insulate
network carriers  from aggressive competitors  and further provide cost  efficiency turned out to be
unprofitable and costly to operate. Consequently some legacy carriers were forced to de-hub some of
the least efficient hub airports e.g. U.S. Airways dismantled its hub status in Pittsburg later during 2004
while Delta de-hubbed from Cincinnati-N. Kentucky in 2006. On the other hand the LCCs responded
to the new market opportunities and emerged as a stronger player in the marketplace.
Our results indicate that the U.S. airline industry in the 2000s has been most competitive like never
before.  Based on the ever  growing role  played by LCCs in disciplining  the  industry,  Alfred  Kahn
(1988), the chief advocate of airline deregulation, quoted this trend as “an illustration of competition
doing exactly what we hoped and expected it  to do”. But the financial distress of network carriers
amidst this competitive environment raises important questions regarding the organizational structure
and long-run equilibrium in the industry.  Although the proponents of deregulation envisioned that
deregulation  may  pave  the  path  of  convergence  towards  a  long  run  competitive  equilibrium,  it  is
unclear whether such a market structure is sustainable in the airline industry. As Borenstein and Rose
(2008) argue that although a case of “destructive competition” is not warranted, it is apparent only time
will tell what market structure evolves in the long run as the industry reorganizes and stabilizes from
this current wave of massive consolidation.
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